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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEX, LIES AND RAPE SHIELD STAT
UTES: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INTERPRETING RAPE SHIELD
STATUTES TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE VICTIM'S
MOTIVE TO FABRICATE
INTRODUCTION

Rape shield statutes prevent criminal defendants from intro
ducing evidence at their trials about the sexual assault victim's! sex
ual history.2 These exclusionary statutes are controversial because
of the strong competing interests involved. 3 On one side, the sexual
assault victim has a privacy interest.4 Rape shield statutes prevent
an accused from examining embarrassing and humiliating details
from the victim's sexual history in the accused's trial. s By excluding
this evidence, proponents of rape shield statutes believe that rape
shield statutes encourage women to report sexual assaults and help
to eliminate gender bias in the courtroom. 6
On the other hand, rape shield statutes may exclude evidence
1. In this Note, the words victim and alleged victim will be used interchangeably.
2. For example, the Massachusetts Rape Shield Statute states:
Evidence of the reputation of a victim's sexual conduct [and] ... [e]vidence of
specific instances of a victim's sexual conduct ... shall not be admissible [in a
sexual assault proceeding] except [as] evidence of the victim's sexual conduct
with the defendant or evidence of recent conduct of the victim alleged to be
the cause of any physical feature, characteristic, or condition of the victim;
provided, however, that such evidence shall be admissible only after an in
camera hearing . . . .
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 21B (1992).
3. See, e.g., Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998,1002-03 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (acknowl
edging both the legitimate interests of rape shield statutes and the accused's right to
present testimony in his own behalf), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 57 (1994). See infra notes
129-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of Stephens.
4. ld. See also Ann Althouse, The Lying Woman, the Devious Prostitute and
Other Stories from the Evidence Casebook, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 914, 972-73 (1994) (men
tioning that rape shield statutes are enacted to protect a sexual assault victim's privacy
interests); Tanya Bagne Marcketti, Note, Rape Shield Laws: Do They Shield the Chil
dren?, 78 IOWA L. REv. 751, 755 (1993) (rape shield statutes "protect the victim's legiti
mate expectation of privacy"); Sakthi Murthy, Comment, Rejecting Unreasonable
Sexual Expectations: Limits on Using a Rape Victim's Sexual History to Show the De
fendant's Mistaken Beliefin Consent, 79 CAL. L. REv. 541,551 (1991) (noting one of the
rape shield statute's purposes is to protect the privacy of victims).
5. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991) (rape victims need protec
tion from "surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy").
6. Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A
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vital to the accused's defense.7 Such exclusions could compromise
the accused's right to a fair trial by preventing consideration of evi
dence which may tend to show that the sexual assault victim
fabricated the charges against the accused. 8 When the victim's mo
tive to fabricate is related to her sexual history, it becomes difficult
to fulfill the objectives of rape shield statutes without infringing
upon the defendant's right to examine the victim's motive to
fabricate. 9
This Note considers the issue of whether courts should inter-.
pret rape shield statutes to exclude evidence relating to the victim's
motive to fabrIcate when that evidence incorporates the victun's
prior sexual conduct. Part I discusses the. background of both the
accused's right to present testimony examining a witness's motive
to fabricate and rape shield statutes.. Part II.A weighs the interests
protected by rape shield statutes against the defendant's right to
examine a witness's motive to fabricate in light of United States
Supreme Court precedent. Part II.A concludes that Supreme Court
precedent prevents courts from interpreting rape shield statutes to
exclude sexual history evidence when it relates to the victim's mo
tive to fabricate. However, Part II.B discusses how courts can use
Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REv. 763,767,773-76 (1986) (discussing
rape law reform movement and critically examining different rape shield schemes).
7. See, e.g., Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1002-03. See also Steven I. Friedland, Date Rape
and the Culture of Acceptance, 43 FLA. L. REv. 487, 516 (1991) (stating that the right to
cross-examine victim for motive to lie may be an innocent accused's last hope); Lisa·
Hamilton Theilmeyer, Note, Beyond Maryland v. Craig: Can and Should Adult Rape
Victims Be Permitted to Testify by Closed-Circuit Television?, 67 IND. LJ. 797, 813
(1992) ("Prohibiting criminal defendants accused of rape from introducing evidence
available to defendants ori trial for any other crime clearly implicates the confrontation
clause.").
8. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582 (1961) (citing 1 JAMES F. STEPHEN,
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 442, 444 (1882». Noted criminal law
authority, Sir James Stephen, said: "I am convinced by much experience that question
ing, or the power of giving evidence is a positive assistance, and a highly important one
...." Id. See infra note 15 for a discussion of Ferguson.
9. A motive to fabricate in the context of sexual assault is evidence that suggests a
victim might be lying about the occurrence of the sexual assault. See Stephens, 13 F.3d
at 1002-03 (considering the defendant's contention that the victim invented the sexual
assault charges against the defendant because the defendant had made vulgar state- .
ments which incorporated the victim's sexual history). See also United States v. Payne,
944 F.2d 1458, 1469 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that "[t]he right to confront witnesses in
cludes the right to ... show their possible bias or self-interest in testifying," but that the
defendant's evidence was not relevant to the victim's motive to fabricate), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 975 (1992); United States v. Nez, 661 F.2d 1203, 1206 (10th Cir. 1981) (noting·
that the motive to fabricate is always a proper subject for examination although the
defendant could not characterize the evidence as such for the first time on appeal).
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existing rules of evidence to dull the effect of this conclusion on
rape shield statutes.
I.

BACKGROUND

This part discusses the background of the sexual assault de
fendant's and victim's conflicting rights. Part I.A discusses the ori
gin and evolution of the defendant's right to present witnesses in his
or her own behalf. Particularly, this section focuses on the United
States Supreme Court's recognition of the defendant's right to ex
amine a witness's motive to fabricate. Part I.B examines the history
of rape shield statutes by considering legislative and judicial treat
ment of rape shield legislation.
A.

The Right to Present Testimony and the Right to Examine a
Witness's Motive to Fabricate
1.

Evolution of the Right to Present Testimony

, The Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause guaran
tees to the accused the right to present witnesses in his own be
half. tO In federal cases, the Sixth Amendment can be used to
enforce this right. l l In,state cases, the right to present witnesses is
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,
which the United States Supreme Court has concluded incorporates
the Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause. 12 Included in
the defendant's right to present witnesses in his or her own behalf is
the privilege to testify in one's own behalf. 13 This has not always
been the case. 14
In sixteenth century England, prisoners were allowed to argue
10. u.s. CoNST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prose
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id.
11. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas,483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987) (holding Arkansas's rule
that hypnotically refreshed testimony is inadmissible per se violates the criminal de
fendant's right to testify in his or her own behalf). See infra notes 31-36 and accompa
'
nying text for a discussion of Rock.
12. E.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967). The Fourteenth Amend
ment Due Process Clause requires that "[n]o state ... deprive any person of life,liberty,
or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, d. 1.
13. Rock,483 U.S. at 52. See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text for a dis
cussion of Rock.
14. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) ("The right of an accused to testify
in his defense is of relatively recent origin. Until the latter part of the preceding cen
tury, criminal defendants ... were considered to be disqualified from giving sworn
testimony ....").

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

544

[Vol. 18:541

directly with the king's counsel,15 However, prisoners did not have
the right to call witnesses or retain counsel,16 In seventeenth cen
tury England, criminal defendants were first granted the right to
present witnesses in their own behalf,17 After this change, the ac
cused was no longer allowed to testify in his or her own behalf be
cause he or she was considered to be an interested party and
incapable of delivering competent testimony.1 8
The practice of disqualifying the accused as a witness began to
erode in the United States when, in 1859, Maine enacted the first
statute allowing criminal defendants to testify during trials for cer
tain offenses. 19 Later, in 1864, Maine enacted the first comprehen
sive statute in the "English-speaking world" that empowered
criminal defendants to testify in all trials regardless of the offense. 20
Congress enacted a similar federal statute in 1878.21
The United States Supreme Court attacked the common-law
disqualification rule in Washington v. Texas.22 In Washington, the
Court interpreted two Texas statutes that had the joint effect of ex
cluding the testimony of a co-participant in the appellant's murder
trial.23 The co-participant's testimony was essential to the accused's
defense in his murder trial.24 Without the excluded testimony, the
appellant was convicted.25
In reversing the appellant's conviction, the Supreme Court
held that the accused's right to have compulsory process for ob
taining witnesses in his or her favor is incorporated in the Due Pro
15. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570,573-74 (1961). In Ferguson, the United
States Supreme Court, while examining a Georgia statute which was the last United
States state statute to disqualify criminal defendants from testifying in their own behalf,
discussed the history of the right to present testimony in one's own behalf. Id. at 571
86. Ultimately, the Court did not strike down the Georgia statute because the defend
ant did not raise the issue of the statute's constitutionality. Id. at 596.
16. Id. at 573-74 (citing 1 JAMES F. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 326, 350 (1882».
17. Id. at 574.
18. Id.
19. Jd. at 577.
20. Id.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1994). The current federal statute, which is substantively
the same as the original federal statute, states: "In trial of all persons charged with the
commission of offenses against the United States ... the person charged shall, at his
own request, be a competent witness." Id.
22. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).·
23. Id. at 16-17. Read together, the two Texas statutes prevented a person
charged as an accomplice from testifying as a witness in favor of his partner. Id. at 16.
24. Id.
25.

Jd.
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cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 26 In so deciding, the
Court applied the test of whether the Sixth Amendment Compul
sory Process Clause is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial."27
The Washington Court further stated that "[t]he right to offer testi
mony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is
in plain terms the right to present a defense . . . . This right is a
fundamental element of due process of law."28 However, the Court
did not have an opportunity to determine whether defendants have
a right to testify in their own behalf because it was not faced with
that issue.
After Washington, the United States Supreme Court repeat
edly stated in dicta that criminal defendants have a right to testify in
their own behalf. 29 However, the Court did not squarely confront
the issue of whether a defendant could testify in his own behalf
until Rock v. Arkansas. 3D In Rock, the United States Supreme
Court considered the Arkansas Supreme Court's adoption of a rule
that hypnotically-refreshed testimony is inadmissible per se. 31 The
Court held that Arkansas's inadmissible per se rule violated the
criminal defendant's right to testify in his own behalf. 32 In so hold
ing, the Court stated that the criminal defendant's right to testify in
his or her own behalf has three textual sources in the Constitution:
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause; the Sixth Amend
ment Compulsory Process Clause; and as a "necessary corollary" to
26.
27.
28.

[d. at 17-18.
[d. at 18 n.6 (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963)).
[d. at 19. However, the defendant's right to present witnesses in his own be

half may be abridged if other legitimate interests exist and preventing the defendant's
proffered testimony is not "arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes ... [it was]
designed to serve." Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1987).
29. E.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975) (right to testify in
one's own behalf is essential to due process); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225
(1971) ("Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense ....").
30. 483 U.S. 44 (1987). See also Louis M. Holscher, The Legacy of Rock v. Ar
kansas: Protecting Criminal Defendants' Right to Testify in Their Own Behalf, 19 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 223 (1993); Andrew C. Callari, Note, Rock v.
Arkansas: Hypnotically 'Refreshed' Testimony or Hypnotically 'Manufactured' Testi
mony?, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 136 (1988); Dean R. Gallego, Note, Hypnosis and Crimi
nal Defendants: Life in the Eighth Circuit and Beyond Rock v. Arkansas, 53 Mo. L.
REv. 823 (1988); Carolyn E. Moller, Comment, The Courts' Reaction to Rock v. Arkan
sas: The AdmiSsibility of a Witness's Testimony After He Has Been Hypnotized, 15 AM.
J. TRIAL ADvoc. 559 (1992).
31. Rock, 483 U.S. at 45.
32. [d. at 62. Exclusion of hypnotically-induced testimony implicates the right to
testify in one's own behalf because the defendant, if allowed, would have testified to
what was in his mind. See id. at 56-61.
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the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 33
The Supreme Court also held in Rock that the defendant's
right to testify in his or her own behalf has limitations. 34 The Court
emphasized that the right to testify in one's own behalf may give
way to other legitimate interests. 35 However, in abridging the de
. fendant's right to testify in his own behalf, "restrictions ... may not
be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed
to serve. "36
Through time, the courts have recognized the defendant's right
to present relevant testimony. This right now includes the privilege
to testify in one's own behalf. 37 However, the Supreme Court has
also recognized that the defendant's right to present relevant testi
mony may be abridged by other legitimate interests in the criminal
process. Courts may restrict the defendant's right if favoring other
legitimate interests is neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the
detrimental effect on the defendant. 38

33. Id. at 51-53. The right to testify in one's own behalf is one of the rights "es
sential to due process of law in a fair adversary process." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806,819 n.15 (1975) (holding that the trial court violated the appellant's Sixth Amend
ment rights by forcing the appellant to accept a state-appointed public defender). In
addition, the right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment must logically include the accused's right to testify for himself.
Rock, 483 U.S. at 52. Finally, the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled
testimony must necessarily encompass the right. to testify if the defendant so desires.
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,229-30 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (holding de
fendant's statement, which was inadmissible due to state's failure to satisfy procedural
safeguards, was admissible to attack the defendant's credibility, provided it was proven
sufficiently trustworthy). The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination
"is fulfilled only when an accused is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak.'" Id. (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,8 (1964».
34. Rock, 483 U.S. at 55. The Supreme Court had previously held that "[i]n the
exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with estab
lished rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in
the ascertainment of guilt and innocence." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302
(1973) (trial court's strict application of common-law rule against impeaching one's own
witness, coupled with exclusion of testimony that should have been admissible under
hearsay exception as a declaration against interest, violated appellant's due process
rights).
35. Rock, 483 U.S. at 55-56. For example, there is no constitutional right to pres
ent perjurious testimo~y. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95 (1993) (increasing
sentence for obstruction of justice did not violate criminal defendant's right to testify in
his own behalf).
36. Rock, 483 U.S. at 55-56.
37. Id. at 51; Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 (1986).
38. Rock, 483 U.S. at 55-56.
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Importance of the Right to Present Testimony About a
Witness's Motive to Fabricate

In Davis v. Alaska 39 and Olden v. Kentucky 40 the United States
Supreme Court recognized that the right to examine a witness's mo
tive to fabricate is a critical part of the defendant's right to present
evidence on his own behalf.41 In Davis, the petitioner was charged
with and convicted of burglary and grand larceny.42 One of the key
witnesses in the trial was a juvenile who was on probation for bur
glary. The juvenile witness stated that he saw the petitioner with
another man outside a blue Chevrolet sedan near the location of a
safe that the petitioner allegedly stole.43 The prosecutor sought a
protective order to shield the juvenile witness from references to his
juvenile record. The petitioner objected to the protective order.
He stated that he only intended to introduce proof of the juvenile's
record to show that the juvenile witness identified the petitioner out
of fear that his probation might be adversely affected if he did not. 44
39. 415 U.S. 308,319-21 (1974) (holding that the trial court should not have pre
vented the defendant from introducing a juvenile witness's prior criminal activity under
a juvenile record-protection statute,' because referring to the record was necessary to
show that the witness had a motive to fabricate). For a discussion of Davis, see Leo A.
Farhat & Richard C. Kraus, Michigan's "Rape-Shield" Statute: Questioning the Wisdom
of Legislative Determinations of Relevance, 4 CoOLEY L. REv. 545, 553-54 (1987) (stat
ing that sexual history evidence that implicates victim's motive to fabricate should be
admissible under Davis); H. Lane Kneedler, Sexual Assault Law Reform in Virginia-A
Legislative History, 68 VA. L. REv. 459, 495 n.139 (1982) (noting rape shield cases rely
on Davis to allow defendants to examine victim's motive to fabricate); Alice Susan
Andre-Clark, Note, Whither Statutory Rape Laws: Of Michael M., the Fourteenth
Amendment, and Protecting Women from Sexual Aggression, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1933,
1986 (1992) ("[T]he state's interest in protecting the witness [from exposure to sexual
history evidence] may be stronger than in Davis . ... In rape cases, the victim may face
a painful public exposure of her relationship with the defendant as well as her recent
sexual history.").
40. 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (per curiam). See infra notes 50-59 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Olden. For law review treatment of Olden, see Myrna S. Ra
eder, Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis: Ohio's Efforts to Protect Children With
out Eviscerating the Rights of Criminal Defendant's Evidentiary Considerations and the
Rebirth of Confrontation Clause Analysis in Child Abuse Cases, 25 U. ToL. L. REV. 43,
152 (1994) (discussing the holding of Olden); Eileen A. Scali en, Constitutional Dimen
sions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN.
L. REv. 623, 648 n.103 (1992) (noting societal importance of right to examine a wit
ness's bias); Christopher B. Reid, Note, The Sexual Innocence Inference Theory as a
Basis for the Admissibility of a Child Molestation Victim's Prior Sexual Conduct, 91
MICH. L. REv. 827, 831 n.17 (1993) ("refusal to allow the defendant to pursue ...
[theory that the victim lied] violated [the defendant's] Sixth Amendment rights.").
41. Olden, 488 U.S. at 227; Davis, 415 U.S. at 320.
42. Davis, 415 U.S. at 308, 320-21.
43. Id. at 309-10.
44. Id. at 311.
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The judge granted the motion for the protective order pursuant to
an Alaska statute that prohibited the introduction of a juvenile's
record in court.45
After the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the petitioner's con
viction, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 46 The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, finding that the
trial judge had violated the petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to
confront adverse witnesses. 47
The Court recognized that Alaska had valid interests in pro
tecting the confidentiality of a juvenile's records. The Court noted
that the state's interests included: preventing impairment of the ju
venile's rehabilitation process; ensuring that the juvenile did not
lose employment opportunities; preventing the juvenile from com
mitting further delinquent acts; and allowing the juvenile to testify
free from embarrassment and without damage to his reputation. 48
Recognizing these laudable interests, the Court stated that the "pol
icy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender's
record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as
the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness."49
In Olden v. Kentucky,50 the United States Supreme Court fur
ther noted the importance of the defendant's right to effectively
cross-examine a witness for bias. In Olden, the petitioner, along·
with a friend, was indicted for kidnapping, rape and forcible sod
omy. The petitioner sought to introduce evidence that the victim,
who was white, had a motive to fabricate because she did not want
to risk the chance that the black man with whom she was living
would discover her infidelity.51 The trial court excluded the evi
45. Id.
46. The Court considered the issue of:
[W]hether the Confrontation Clause requires that a defendant in a criminal
case be allowed to impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness by cross
examination directed at possible bias deriving from the witness' probationary
status ... when such an impeachment would conflict with a State's asserted
interest in preserving the confidentiality of juvenile adjudications of
delinquency.
Id. at 309.
47. Id. at 320-21.
48. Id. 319-20.
49. Id. at 320. The Court also stated that "[t]he partiality of a witness is subject to
exploration at trial, and is 'always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the
weight of his testimony.'" Id. at 316 (quoting 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 940, at 755 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970».
50. 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (per curiam).
51. Id. at 229-30. The inference suggested by the petitioner is that the victim
would rather her lover believe that she was raped than believe she engaged in a vol un
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dence that the white victim was living with a black man. 52 The
court specifically held that Kentucky's rape shield statute did not
bar the evidence. 53 However, the trial court held that the potential
prejudice in allowing evidence of an interracial living relationship
outweighed the probative value of the evidence. 54 Subsequently,
the petitioner was convicted of the forcible sodomy charge. 55
The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that the
trial court's decision to exclude the evidence of the victim's living
relationship violated the petitioner's Sixth Amendment Confronta
tion Clause rights. 56 In so holding, the Supreme Court relied heav
ily upon its earlier decision in Davis v. Alaska. 57 The Court noted
that preventing a criminal defendant from questioning a witness to
show bias violates the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. 58
The Court stated that "[s]peculation as to the effect of jurors' racial
biases cannot justify exclusion of cross-examination with such
strong potential to demonstrate the falsity of [the victim's]
testimony. "59
Davis and Olden show that the Supreme Court considers the
right to examine witnesses about their motive to fabricate to be
highly important in protecting the defendant's due process rights.
Neither the privacy interests similar to those protected by juvenile
record shield statutes60 nor interests with speculative benefits61 can
justify preventing a defendant from examining a witness's motive to
fabricate.
tary affair with the petitioner because there would be less of a chance that he would end
their relationship. See id.
52. Id. at 230.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 230-31. Allowing evidence of the couple's interracial living relationship
might have lead a prejudiced juror to make a decision on an improper basis. Id. at 232.
55. Id. at 230.
56. Id. at 231.
57. Id. (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974».
58. Id. More specifically, the Court noted that it had recently affirmed Davis in
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), where it stated:
[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that
he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed
to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby "to expose to
the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to
the reliability of the witness."
Id. at 680 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318).
59. Olden, 488 U.S. at 232.
60. Davis, 415 U.S. at 320.
61. Olden, 488 U.S. at 232.
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Rape Shield Statutes and a Victim's Motive to Fabricate

1. History of the Rape Shield Statute
The rape shield statute is a relatively recent creation. 62 At
common law, the accused in a sexual assault trial was permitted to·
show that the victim was unchaste by "inquiring into a victim's
extramarital, consensual sexual relations."63 One of the reasons be
hind this rule was that unchaste women were considered dishon
est. 64 Further, supporters of the common-law doctrine allowing
evidence of the victim's extramarital sexual relations justified the
doctrine by stating that a woman's unchaste character is probative
on the issue of whether the woman consented to sex on a particular
occasion. 65
In the early 1970s, feminist organizations and law enforcement
agencies argued that allowing the accused to introduce evidence
about the victim's sexual history was unjustifiable. 66 They argued
that: (1) sexual morality had changed since the adoption of the
common-law doctrine which allowed evidence about the victim's
unchaste character;67 (2) exclusionary laws are needed to protect
"complainants from a 'second rape' in the courtroom"68; and (3)
rape shield laws would attempt to balance "gender-bias in the de
termination of consent. "69
62. Galvin, supra note 6, at 765 n.3. Michigan enacted the first rape shield statute
in 1974. Id.
63. Richard A. Wayman, Note, Lucas Comes to Visit Iowa: Balancing Interests
Under Iowa's Rape-Shield Evidentiary Rule, 77 IOWA L. REv. 865,869-70 (1992) (dis
cussing the history of rape shield statutes). See also Alison Ray Bunch, Rape Shield,
Survey of Developments in North Carolina and the Fourth Circuit, 1993.72 N.C. L. REV.
1777 (1994) ("before the advent of rape shield laws, the moral character of victims ...
was often an issue").
64. Cheryl Siskin, Note, No. The "Resistance Not Required" Statute and "Rape
Shield Law" May Not Be Enough-Commonwealth v. Berkowitz. 609 A.2d /338 (Pa.
Super. Ct.) (per curiam), alloc. granted, 613 A.2d 556 (Pa. 1992),66 TEMP. L. REV. 531,
557 ("rape shield law was enacted to quell the myth that unchaste women were liars").
65. Galvin, supra note 6, at 808.
66. Wayman, supra note 63, at 871.
67. Id. at 871-72. "Research indicated the vast majority of young women ...
engaged in consensual sexual relations outside of marriage, and men found this behav
ior normal and acceptable." Id. (citations omitted).
68. Lara English Simmons, Note, Michigan v. Lucas: Failing to Define the State
Interest in Rape Shield Legislation, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1592, 1604 (1992) (discussing the
movement to eliminate the common-law doctrine allowing evidence of a woman's un
chaste character). Proponents of rape shield laws argue that victims suffer embarrass
ment and humiliation, causing psychological damage to. the victim's self-esteem. Id.
69. Id. This is a problem particularly when a sexual assault victim reacts passively
rather than resisting. Id. at 1604-05.
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As a result of the rape law reformers' efforts, Michigan enacted
the first rape shield statute in 1974.70 By 1978, over thirty states
had adopted rape shield statutes. 71 In 1978, Congress followed suit
by enacting Federal Rule of Evidence 412, which provides generally
that evidence of an alleged victim's sexual history is inadmissible. 72
Despite this general rule, Rule 412 allows evidence of: specific in
stances of the victim's past sexual conduct with the accused to show
that the victim consented;73 specific instances of the victim's sexual
conduct with a person other than the accused when introduced to
show that the accused was not the source of semen or injury;74 and
specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct when the Constitu
tion requires it to be admitted.75 In addition, Rule 412 requires the
accused to make a written motion, at least fifteen days before the
trial, to offer evidence under one of the aforementioned excep
tions.76 Thereafter, the judge must conduct a hearing in his cham
bet:S to determine whether the evidence is admissible. 77
Congress's principal purpose in enacting Rule 412 was to end
the "degrading and embarrassing disclosure of intimate details
about" the victims' private lives.78 Further, President Jimmy Carter
felt that the law would be helpful in encouraging women to report
rapes by ending the public degradation and humiliation of rape vic
timS.79 Congress recognized that allowing defendants to examine
70. Galvin, supra note 6, at 765 n.3.
71. 124 CoNG. REC. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman).
72. FED. R. EVID. 412. Rule 412 states:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which a
person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape, reputation
or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such
rape or assault is not admissible. (b) ... evidence of a victim's past sexual
behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible, un
less ... (I) admitted in accordance with ... (c)(I) and (c)(2) and is constitu
tionally required ... ; or (2) admitted in accordance with ... (c) and is
evidence of- (A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused
offered by the accused, upon the issue of whether the accused was ... the
source of semen or injury; or (B) past sexual behavior with the accused ... .
Id. For law review treatment of Rule 412, see Paul Nicholas Monnin, Note, Proving
Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual History in Sexual Harassment
Claims Under the 1994 Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 412, 48 VAND. L. REv.
1155 (1995).
73. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(B).
'74. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(A).
75. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(I).
76. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(I).
77. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(2).
78. 124 CoNG. REc. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann).
79. Statement by President Carter on Signing H.R. 4727 into Law, Protection for
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the victim's sexual history contributed to the fact that rape is the
least reported crime. 80
Since Congress enacted Rule 412, all but two states have en
acted rape shield statutes. 81 Rape shield statutes generally fall into
one of four categories. 82 The first category is the Michigan model,
which about half of the states follow. 83 The Michigan model gener
ally excludes all evidence of a victim's sexual history, but allows
limited exceptions to this rule.84 The second model for rape shield
the Privacy of Rape Victims, II PUB. PAPERS: Jimmy Carter 1902 (Oct. 30, 1978). See
also Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey January 1, 1993 
December 31, 1993,45 MERCER L. REv. 1291, 1297 (1994) (noting that "many rape
victims would never report their attackers if defendants were routinely allowed to
showcase the victim's prior sexual activity").
80. 124 CONGo REC. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman). Representative
Holtzman stated:
Too often in this country victims of rape are humiliated and harassed
when they report and prosecute the rape. Bullied and cross-examined about
their prior sexual experiences, many find the trial almost as degrading as the
rape itself.... [I]t is not surprising that ... [rape] is the least reported crime.
Id.
81. Daniel Lowery, Note, The Sixth Amendment, the Preclusionary Sanction, and
Rape Shield Laws: Michigan v. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. 1743 (1991),61 U. CiN. L. REV. 297.
309 (1992) (discussing the history of rape shield statutes). Forty seven states have rape
shield statutes in effect after Tennessee repealed its rape shield statute. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-17-119 (1990) (repealed by Acts 1991, ch. 273, § 34). The two states that
have not passed rape shield statutes are Utah and Arizona. Lowery, supra, at 309 n.76.
However, Arizona courts have created a judicial equivalent to the rape shield statute.
Id. Arizona created its judicial equivalent in State ex rei. Pope V. Superior Court, 545
P.2d 946, 953 (Ariz. 1976). For a list of all of the applicable state and federal statutes,
see Lowery, supra, at 309.
82. Lowery, supra note 81, at 313-14.
83. Id. States that follow the Michigan Model include: Alabama (ALA. CODE
§ 12-21-203 (1995»; Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2)-(5) (West Supp. 1996)); Illi
nois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/115-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995»; Indiana (IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (West 1986»; Kentucky (Ky. R. EVID. 412); Louisiana (LA.
CODE EVID ANN. art. 412 (West 1995»; Maine (ME. R. EVID. 412); Maryland (MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (1992)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 21B
(1994»; Michigan (MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 1991»; Minnesota
(MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347(3), (4), (6) (West Supp. 1996»; Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 491.015 (Vernon Supp. 1996»; Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(2), (3)
(1995»; Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-321 (1989»; New Hampshire (N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (Supp. 1995»; North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-l, R. 412
(1993»; Ohio (OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D)-(F) (Baldwin 1994»; Pennsylvania
(PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104 (1983»; South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1
(Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1995»; Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (Supp.
1995»; Virginia (VA. CoDE ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (Michie 1988»; West Virginia (W. VA.
CODE § 61-8B-ll (1992»; and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 972.11(2) (West 1985 &
Supp. 1995». Lowery, supra note 81, at 313 n.BB.
84. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 1991). These exceptions include
evidence of the victim's "past sexual conduct with the actor" and "[e ]vidence of specific
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statutes is the Arkansas mode1. 85 The Arkansas model provides for
an in camera hearing, at which the judge weighs the probative value
of admitting the evidence of the victim's sexual history against the
likelihood and degree of prejudice. 86
The third species of rape shield statute is modeled after Fed
eral Rule of Evidence 412.87 Like the Michigan model, the federal
model renders evidence of an alleged victim's sexual history inad
missible, subject to limited exceptions. 88 However, the federal
model differs from the Michigan model in that it contains a broad
exception for instances where prohibiting the accused from intro
ducing evidence of the victim's sexual history would violate the ac
cused's constitutional rights.89 The final type of rape shield statute
is the California mode1. 90 The California model allows evidence of
the alleged victim's sexual history to be introduced for certain isinstances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or dis
ease." § 750.52Oj(I)(a), (b). However, to allow sexual history evidence under one of
these exceptions, the judge must first find that the "evidence is material to a fact at
issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its
probative value." § 750.520j(1).
85. Lowery, supra note 81, at 313. States which follow the Arkansas model in
clude: Alaska (ALASKA. STAT. § 12.45.045 (1995»; Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 16
42-101 (Michie 1994»; Colorado (CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-407 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1995»; Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1987»; Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21
3525 (1995»; New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-7 (West 1995»; New Mexico (N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-9-16 (Michie 1994»; Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13
(1994»; South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-22-15 (1995»; Texas (TEX. R.
CRIM. EVID. 412); and Wyoming (WYo. STAT. § 6-2-312 (1988». Lowery, supra note
81, at 313 n.89.
86. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-42-101 (Michie 1994).
87. Lowery, supra note 81, at 314. Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86f
(1994», Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3 (1995», Hawaii (HAW. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 626-1, R. 412 (1995», Iowa (IOWA R. EVID. 412), New York (N.Y. CRIM. PRoe. LAW
§ 60.42 (McKinney 1992», and Oregon (OR. REv. STAT. § 40.210 (1988» as well as the
military (MIL. R. EVID. 412), have based their rape shield laws on the federal model.
Lowery, supra note 81, at 314 n.90.
88. FED. R. EVID. 412. For a discussion of the exceptions to the rape shield stat
utes modeled after Rule 412, see supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
89. FED. R. EVID. 412.
90. Lowery, supra note 81, at 314. States which follow the California model in
clude: California (CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1l03(b) (West Supp. 1995»; Delaware
(DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3508,3509 (1995»; Mississippi (MISS. R. EVID. 412); North
Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-14, -15 (1985»; and Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 2412 (West Supp. 1996». These statutes allow evidence of the victim's
sexual history so long as it is not introduced to show the victim consented. Lowery,
supra note 81, at 314 n.92. Nevada (NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.069, 50.090 (Michie
Supp. 1995» and Washington (WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.0202(2)-(4) (West
1988» exclude evidence of the victim's sexual conduct when introduced only to show
the victim's lack of credibility. Lowery, supra note 81, at 314 n.92.
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sues, but not for others. 91
Although the Supreme Court has never expressly declared any
of the foregoing rape shield models constitutional, the Court implic
itly approved rape shield statutes in Michigan v. Lucas.92 In Lucas,
the defendant was charged with rape. He failed to provide written
notice within ten days of the trial that he intended to present evi
dence about the victim's sexual conduct as required by the Michi
gan rape shield statute under a statutory exception. 93 At trial, the
court denied the defendant's request to admit evidence about the
alleged victim's sexual history, since he had not satisfied the notice
requirement. Subsequently, the judge, in a bench trial, found the
defendant guilty.94
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the judge's decision.
It ruled that Michigan's notice-and-hearing requirement violated
the Sixth Amendment per se. 95 On writ of certiorari, the Supreme
Court found that the notice~and-hearing requirement was not un
constitutional per se, and remanded the case to the Michigan Court
of Appeals for a determination of whether the requirement was un
constitutional under the circumstances. 96
'
The Court recognized that a defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights may be restricted by other legitimate interests, so long as
such restrictions are neither arbitrary nor" 'disproportionate to the
purposes they are designed to serve."'97 The court emphasized that
Michigan's rape shield statute is such "a valid legislative determina
tion that rape victims deserve heightened protection against sur
prise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy."98 In so
holding, the Supreme Court implicitly approved the constitutional
91. See CAL EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103(b) (West Supp. 1995). See supra note 90
for a discussion of the issues for which evidence of the victim's sexual history can be
introduced.
92. 500 U.S. 145, 149-51 (1991) (notice provision of the Michigan rape shield stat
ute is not contrary to the Sixth Amendment per se because it is consistent with the
purpose of rape shield statutes). For law review treatment of Lucas, see Jack M. Mor
gan, Jr., Note, Michigan v. Lucas: Rape Shields, Criminal Discovery Rules, and the Price
We Pay in Pursuit o/the Truth, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 545 (1993); Simmons, supra note 68,
at 1592.
93. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 147.
94. Id. at 147-48.
95. Id. at 148. The Michigan Court of Appeals declared that Michigan's notice
and-hearing requirement served no useful purpose and was insufficient to justify inter
ference with the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment compulsory process rights. Id.
96. Id. at 153.
97. Id. at 149, 151 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,56 (1987».
98. Id. at 149-50.
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ity of rape shield statutes. 99
2.

Case Law in Opposition to Courts Interpreting Rape
Shield Statutes to Exclude Evidence About the
Victim's Motive to Fabricate

Several courts have confronted the issue of the accused's right
to present relevant testimony about the victim's sexual history as it
relates to the victim's motive to fabricate sexual assault charges.1°o
99. Id. Although the Supreme Court did not expressly approve rape shield stat
utes, it is a reasonable inference to believe that the Court would have found that rape
shield statutes were constitutional if faced with that issue. The Supreme Court noted
that a legitimate interest may restrict a defendant's right to present relevant testimony
so long as such a restriction is neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to its designated
purpose. Id. at 149, 151 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987}). Further,
the court held that Michigan's rape shield statute served the legitimate interest of pro
tecting rape victims from "surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy."
Id. at 149-50. Therefore, one can argue that rape shield statutes can restrict the defend
ant's right to present evidence as long as such a restriction is neither arbitrary nor dis
proportionate to its designated purpose. See also B.J. George, Jr., United States
Supreme Court 1990-1991 Term: Criminal Procedure Highlights, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
535,552-54 (1991) (discussing the constitutionality of rape shield legislation in light of
Lucas); Sloan K. Banfield, Casenote, Judicial Manipulation of Michigan's Rape Shield
Act?!: People v. Wilhem, 9 COOLEY L. REv. 497, 505 (1992) (noting that the Lucas
Court found rape shield statute's notice requirement to serve the legitimate state inter
est of protecting against surprise, harassment, and undue delay); Christopher B. Reid,
Note, The Sexual Innocence Inference Theory as a Basis for the Admissibility of a Child
Molestation Victim's Prior Sexual Conduct, 91 MICH. L. REv. 827, 837-38 (1993) (quot
ing Lucas for the point that rape shield statutes are not unconstitutional simply because
they prevent the defendant from introducing relevant evidence).
100. United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1469 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that,
although "[t]he right to confront witnesses includes the right to ... show their possible
bias or self-interest in testifying," the defendant's evidence was not relevant to the vic
tim's motive to fabricate), cert. denied, 112 S. Q. 1598 (1992); United States v. Nez, 661
F.2d 1203, 1206 (10th Cir. 1981) (noting that the motive to fabricate is always a proper
subject for examination, although the defendant could not characterize the evidence as
such for the first time on appeal); United States v. Williams, 37 M.J. 352, 359-60
(C.M.A. 1993) (holding that newly discovered evidence relating to the victim's motive
to fabricate would have been admissible); Lewis v. State, 591 So. 2d 922, 926 (Fla. 1991)
(the lower court erred in excluding evidence because it was introduced to show that the
victim had a motive to fabricate); State v. Parker, 730 P.2d 921, 925 (Idaho 1986) (vic
tim's motive to fabricate is always an issue, and exclusion of evidence about the victim's
belief that she was pregnant was erroneous); White v. State, 598 A.2d 187, 193-94 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (evidence of victim's sexual history offered to show that victim had
a motive to fabricate was not related to her possible motive to fabricate); Common
wealth v. Joyce, 415 N.E.2d 181, 186-87 (Mass. 1981) (evidence of prior acts may be
relevant to show motive to fabricate in certain circumstances as in this case where vic
tim had previously been arrested for prostitution and might have lied to avoid arrest);
People v. LaLone 437 N.W.2d 611, 621 (Mich. 1989) (Archer, J., concurring in part)
(trial court did not err in excluding evidence of victim's sexual history as it related to
her motive to fabricate because such motive could be sufficiently established by other
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All of these courts have recognized that the defendant has a right to
cross-examine a witness about her motive to fabricate. 101 Many of
these courts have held that the policy interests behind rape shield
statutes cannot justify restricting the defendant's right to examine
the victim's motive to fabricate. 102 In fact, United States courts of
appeals have held that the defendant may introduce relevant sexual
history evidence to examine a victim's motive to fabricate. 103 How
ever, these cases refused to allow the defendant to introduce the
evidence on alternative grounds. 104 Therefore, this section dis
cusses other federal and state cases that better support the view
that courts should not interpret rape shield statutes to exclude evi
dence showing the victim's motive to fabricate.
Courts that interpret rape shield statutes to allow sexual his
tory evidence related to the victim's motive to fabricate recognize
the potentially devastating nature of motive to fabricate evi
dence. 1 os In United States v. Williams, 106 the Court of Military Ap
peals held that the military judge did not consider the defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights when it denied the defendant's motion to
reopen the case on grounds of newly discovered evidence. 107 The
defendant sought to introduce newly discovered evidence that the
victim had been involved in an extramarital affair and had fabri
cated the rape charges against the defendant to prevent her lover
from discovering her further infidelity. This discovery could have
caused him to end his relationship with her. lOS
evidence); State v. Rogers, 642 A.2d 932 (N.H. 1994) (trial court properly limited testi
mony of victim's sexual history to its relation to her motive to fabricate); State v. Jalo,
557 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (concluding that, as in Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308 (1974), policy considerations must give way to the defendant's Sixth Amend
ment rights to examine witness for bias); Winfield v. Commonwealth, 301 S.E.2d 15, 21
(Va. 1983) (noting that rape shield statute provides for exception when evidence is ad
vanced to show the victim's motive to fabricate).
101. See, e.g., Payne, 944 F.2d at 1469; Nez, 661 F.2d at 1206; Williams, 37 M.J. at
360; Lewis, 591 So. 2d at 925; Parker, 730 P.2d at 925; White, 598 A.2d at 192-93; Joyce,
415 N.E.2d at 186; LaLone, 437 N.W.2d at 621; Rogers, 642 A.2d at 934-35; Jalo, 557
P.2d at 1362; Winfield, 301 S.E.2d at 21.
102. See, e.g., Nez, 661 F.2d at 1206; Williams, 37 M.J. at 360; Lewis, 591 So.2d at
925; Parker, 730 P.2d at 925; Joyce, 415 N.E.2d at 186-87; Jalo, 557 P.2d at 1362; Win
field, 301 S.E.2d at 21.
103. See Payne, 944 F.2d at 1466-69; Nez, 661 F.2d at 1206.
104. Payne, 944 F.2d at 1469 (defendant's proffered evidence was not relevant to
the victim'S motive to fabricate); Nez, 661 F.2d at 1206 (defendant precluded from rais
ing issue for first time on appeal).
105. E.g., Williams, 37 M.J. at 360-61.
106. 37 M.J. 352 (C.M.A. 1993).
107. Id. at 361.
108. Id. at 355.
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One of the judge's reasons for excluding the evidence was that
it would not have been admissible under the military rape shield
statute. 109 In partial reliance upon Olden v. Kentucky, the Court of
Military Appeals held that the military judge abused his discretion
by denying the defendant's request to present evidence relating to
the victim's motive to fabricate. 110 It reasoned that had the judge
allowed the evidence, it would have had a devastating impact upon
the victim's credibility.ll1
Courts also realize that the accused's defense could be compro
mised if he is not allowed to examine a witness's motive to fabricate
by introducing sexual history evidence. 112 In Commonwealth v.
Joyce,113 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the
trial court improperly excluded evidence about the alleged victim's
motive to fabricate.11 4 The police found the alleged victim and the
accused naked outside a car in a vacant parking 10t. 115 At trial, the
defendant wanted to introduce evidence that the alleged victim had
been found in similar situations on two prior occasions that resulted
in her arrest for prostitution. 116 The defendant sought to introduce
this evidence to show that the alleged victim might have lied to
avoid more trouble with the police.!17
The trial judge held that evidence of the alleged victim's arrests
for prostitution was barred by the Massachusetts rape shield stat
ute. llS In reversing the trial judge's decision, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts stated that rape shield statutes cannot be
interpreted to abridge the defendant's right to show motive or
bias. 119 The court stressed that "the right to cross-examine a com
plainant in a rape case to show a false accusation may be the last
refuge of an innocent defendant. "120
Courts usually employ the reasoning of Olden v. Kentucky and
Davis v. Alaska in interpreting rape shield statutes to allow sexual
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 359.
Id. at 360-61. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988).
Williams, 37 M.J. at 360-61.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Joyce, 415 N.E.2d 181, 186 (Mass. 1981).
415 N.E.2d 181 (Mass. 1981).
Id. at 187.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 186.
Id.
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history evidence related to the victim's motive to fabricate. l21 In
Lewis v. State, 122 the Florida Supreme Court held that the trial
court erred by excluding evidence that was offered to show that the
victim accused the defendant, her stepfather, of sexual assault to
stop him from telling the victim's mother about her sexual activity
with a third person. 123 The Florida Supreme Court cited Olden v.
Kentucky and Davis v. Alaska in support of its holding. 124 The
court stated that rape shield statutes "must give way to the defend
ant's constitutional rights."125
Williams ,Joyce, and Lewis illustrate the types of reasons courts
use to exclude sexual history evidence related to the victim's motive
to fabricate. Courts interpret rape shield statutes to allow sexual
history evidence related to the victim's motive to fabricate because:
motive to fabricate evidence can have a devastating effect on the
victim's credibility; it is necessary to the accused's defense: and the
reasoning of Olden and Davis support the defendant's right to ex
amine a victim's motive to fabricate.
3.

Case Law in Support of Courts Interpreting Rape Shield
Statutes to Exclude Evidence About the Victim's
Motive to Fabricate

Williams, Joyce, and Lewis exemplify the reasoning that courts
employ to hold that rape shield statutes cannot restrict the defend
ant's right to examine a witness's motive to fabricate. 126 However,
other courts exclude evidence of a victim's sexual history when in
troduced for the purpose of showing that the victim had a motive to
fabricateP7
121. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 591 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1991). See also Olden v.
Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988), discussed supra at notes 50-59 and accompanying text;
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), discussed supra at notes 39-49 and accompanying
text.
122. 591 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1991).
123. Id. at 923.
124. Id. at 925.
125. Id.
126. See United States v. Williams, 37 M.J. 352 (C.M.A. 1993); Lewis, 591 So. 2d
at 922-926; Commonwealth v. Joyce, 415 N.E.2d 181 (Mass. 1981).
127. See, e.g., Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1002 (7th Cir.) (en bane), cert. de
nied, 115 S. Ct. 57 (1994); Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544, 1550 (9th Cir. 1992) (fact that
victim posed nude for magazines and acted in pornographic movies did not show that
she had a motive to fabricate); United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1469 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding sanitized version of story involving victim's punishment for episode of
"heavy petting" and resulting motive to fabricate was enough to satisfy the defendant's
right to confront adverse witnesses), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1598 (1992); Wright v. State,
513 A.2d 1310, 1314-15 (Del. 1986) (no sufficient factual basis to show that victim had
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Courts that exclude sexual history evidence even when it re
lates to the victim's motive to fabricate find that the policies of rape
shield statutes and the fact that defendants can usually establish the
victim's motive without sexual history evidence justify such exclu
sions. l28 In Stephens v. Miller,129 the victim and the accused told
two entirely different stories about what had occurred on the night
of the alleged attempted sexual assault. 130 In the accused's version,
he claimed that the victim fabricated the charge of rape because
statements that he made angered her. The defendant asserted that
he and the victim were engaged in "doggy fashion" sexual inter
course. 131 During this alleged sexual act, the defendant asked the
alleged victim if she enjoyed sex in that manner and the defendant
indicated that a friend told the defendant that she did. In addition,
the defendant claimed that he commented about switching part
ners.132 The defendant claimed these statements angered the al
leged victim so much that she withdrew her consent to the sexual
intercourse and fabricated the attempted rape charges.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
quoted Michigan v. Lucas in declaring that rape shield statutes
serve the legitimate interest of protecting the victim from "surprise,
motive to fabricate based on her possible fear that she was pregnant from sexual inter
course with her boyfriend on the previous day), affd, 616 A.2d 1215 (1992); Snyder v.
State, 410 S.E.2d 173, 176 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (trial court did not commit error in
refusing to admit evidence about the victim's sexual history introduced to show that the
victim had a motive to lie); People v. Hodges, 636 N.E.2d 638, 640 (Ill. App. Ct.) (evi
dence that victim lied to prevent husband from discovering adulterous lifestyle was ir
relevant to her alleged motive to fabricate, because person who wished conduct to go
unnoticed would not draw attention to self by telling the police about it), appeal denied,
622 N.E.2d 1217 (Ill. 1993); State v. Zuniga, 703 P.2d 805, 809-10 (Kan. 1985) (fact that
victim was pregnant by man other than husband was not relevant to her possible motive
to fabricate, since she had received a tubal ligation and had no way to know that she
was pregnant at the time of the offense); White v. State, 598 A.2d 187, 193 (Md. 1991)
(holding that evidence that victim had previously offered sex for drugs was not reason
ably related to her motive to fabricate); People v. LaLone, 437 N.W.2d 611, 617 (Mich.
1989) (Archer, J., concurring in part) (court's exclusion of evidence that stepfather's
punishment of victim for sex-related incidents for purpose of showing motive to fabri
cate did not violate rights of confrontation).
128. Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1002.
129. 13 F.3d 998 (7th Cir.) (en bane), cen. denied, 115 S. Ct. 57 (1994).
130. Id. at 1000-01. The victim claimed that she awoke in the living room of her
trailer and found the defendant standing by the front door. Id. at 1000. The victim
further claims that thereafter, the defendant tried to force himself on the victim. Before
he was able to remove his pants, the victim broke free and ran to a room occupied by
her sister and brother-in-law. The defendant then fled the apartment. Id.
131. Id. at 1000.
132. Id.
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harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy."133 The court
concluded, therefore, that rape shield statutes may restrict the de
fendant's right to present testimony if such a restriction is neither
arbitrary nor disproportionate to its intended purpose. l34
The court of appeals noted that the trial court allowed the de
fendant to testify that he had said something to the victim which
had angered her. In addition, the court of appeals emphasized that
the proposed testimony was the "kind of generalized inquiry into
the reputation or past sexual conduct of the victim" that causes the
precise type of embarrassment and public denigration that rape
shield statutes were enacted to prevent. 135 In light of these findings,
the court of appeals held that the trial court's decision to restrict the
proposed evidence was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to
the rape shield statute's designated purposes.136
Other courts exclude motive to fabricate evidence on relevancy
grounds.137 In People v. Hodges,138 the Appellate Court of Illinois
also excluded evidence about the victim's sexual history as it related
to the victim's motive to fabricate. 139 The defendant sought to in
troduce evidence that the victim had previously failed to pursue
charges against a man whom the victim claimed had raped her.1 40
The defendant's theory behind his desire to introduce this evidence
was that the victim had falsely accused the other man and the de
fendant in order to hide her adulterous lifestyle from her husband
who was serving in the armed forces. 141
The court relied upon the doctrine of relevance to exclude the
defendant's proffered evidence. 142 The court did not accept the de
fendant's argument that the rape charges were part of the victim's
scheme to hide her sexual relations from her husband. It reasoned
that "an individual who wishes for something to go unnoticed usu
ally does not call attention to it."143
133. Id. at 1002 (citing Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991)). See supra
notes 92-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lucas.
134. Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1002 (citing Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149-50; Rock v. Arkan
sas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987)). See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text for a discus
sion of Rock.
135. Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1002.
136. Id. at 1002-03.
137. See, e.g., People v. Hodges, 636 N.E.2d 638,640 (III. App. Ct. 1993).
138. 636 N.E.2d 638, 640 (III. App. Ct. 1993).
139. Id. at 640.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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Stephens and Hodges illustrate the types of reasons that courts
use to interpret rape shield statutes to exclude evidence relating to
the victim's motive to fabricate. Courts interpret rape shield stat
utes to exclude evidence relating to the victim's motive to fabricate
because: it is necessary to accomplish the goals of rape shield stat
utes; sometimes the defendant can establish the victim's motive to
lie without referring to the sexual history evidence; and sometimes
the sexual history evidence is not probative on the issue of the vic
tim's motive to lie.

II.

ANALYSIS

Criminal defendants generally have the right to present rele
vant testimony in their own behalf.144 In fact, the right to present
relevant testimony in one's behalf is a "fundamental element of due
process of law."145 This includes the right to examine a witness's
motive to fabricate. 146
However, the criminal defendant's right to present relevant
testimony in his or her own behalf may be limited by other legiti
mate interests so long as the restriction is neither arbitrary nor dis
proportionate to the purpose the restriction was designed to
serve. 147 Shielding rape victims from "surprise, harassment, and
unnecessary invasions of privacy" caused by the criminal defend
ant's unjustified examination of the victim's sexual history repre
sents such a legitimate interest.1 48 Thus, the pertinent inquiry in
resolving this conflict is whether the benefit gained by advancing
the interests of rape shield statutes is arbitrary and disproportionate
when compared to the detrimental effect on the defendant's right to
examine a witness's motive to fabricate.
Part A.1 of this section weighs the privacy interests protected
by rape shield statutes against the defendant's right to examine a
witness's motive to fabricate. Part A.2 balances the effect that rape
shield statutes have on encouraging women to report sexual as
144. E.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S.
157,164 (1986); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14,17-19 (1967). See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Rock and supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of Washington.
145. Washington, 388 U.S. at 19.
146. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232 (1988) (per curiam); Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308,319-20 (1974).
147. Rock, 483 U.S. at 55-56. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Rock.
148. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 150 (1991). See supra notes 92-99 and ac
companying text for a discussion of Lucas.
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saults against the defendant's rights to examine a witness's motive
to lie. Part A.3 weighs the rape shield statutes' role in balancing
gender bias in the court room against the defendant's right to ex
amine the witness's motive to fabricate. Part A.4 considers all of
these factors together. In addition, Part A.4 concludes that, gener
ally, interpreting rape shield statutes to exclude evidence relating to
the victim's motive to fabricate is arbitrary and disproportionate to
the interests they were designed to serve. Part B of this section
discusses how courts can use existing rules of evidence to dull the
effect that this conclusion has on rape shield statutes.
A.

Weighing the Competing Interests
-

1.

.

Privacy Interests Versus Defendant's Constitutional
Rights

The United States Supreme Court held in Davis v. Alaska that
the restriction upon the defendant's right to cross-examine a wit
ness about the witness's motive to fabricate was disproportionate to
its intended purpose. 149 In Davis, the intended purpose in restrict
ing the defendant's proffered evidence was to protect the confiden
tiality of a juvenile witness's criminal record. 150 The Supreme
Court listed some of the privacy interests protected by juvenile-rec
ord protection statutes. 151 First,. they prevent impairment of the
juvenile's rehabilitation process. 152 In addition, juvenile-record
protection statutes ensure that the juvenile will not lose employ
ment opportunities. 153 Also, they discourage juveniles from com
mitting further crimes. 154 Finally, juvenile-record protection stat
utes allow a juvenile to testify free from embarrassment and with
out loss to her reputation. 155
Much like the privacy interests balanced by the Supreme Court
in Davis, rape shield statutes protect the privacy interests of the
149. Olden, 488 U.S. at 231. See also Davis, 415 U.S. at 320-21. See supra notes
50-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Olden and supra notes 39-49 and ac
companying text for a discussion of Davis.
150. Davis, 415 U.S. at 320.
151. Id. at 319-20.
152. Jd. at 319.
153. Jd.
154. See id. The Court did not elaborate on exactly how juvenile-record protec
tion statutes discourage a juvenile from committing future acts. A reasonable inference
is that if you do not remind a juvenile that he has acted like a criminal, he is more likely
to behave like a law abiding citizen.
155. Id.
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victim.156 Courts and legislatures have found that rape shield stat
utes protect the privacy interests of sexual assault victims.1 57 Rape
shield statutes accomplish this goal by helping to end the "degrad
ing and embarrassing disclosure of intimate details" about the vic
tims' private lives. 158 In this way, rape shield statutes prevent the
victim from suffering any unnecessary psychological damage or loss
of self esteem. 159 One writer has gone as far as saying that the pri
vacy interest advanced by rape shield statutes is necessary to pro
tect the victim from suffering a second rape on the witness stand
during trial. l60 Both rape shield statutes and juvenile-record pro
tection statutes preserve the privacy rights of the respective par
ties. 161 The United States Supreme Court held in Davis v. Alaska
that the privacy interests advanced by juvenile record protection
statutes could not justify restricting the defendant's right to ex
amine a witness's motive to fabricate. 162 Therefore, Davis seems to
control the resolution of this issue.1 63 However, before deciding
that Davis controls, one must determine that the privacy interests
protected by rape shield statutes and juvenile record-protection
statutes are sufficiently similar.
Rape shield statutes might protect more important privacy in
terests than juvenile-record protection statutes for several reasons.
First, rape trials are very traumatic for the victim.l64 Attacks on the
victim's credibility by way of sexual history evidence, evidence
about her clothes, evidence about her demeanor around the de
fendant, and similar evidence can make the victim feel like she is on
trial. 165 Rape shield statutes attempt to eliminate the prospect of
156. 124 CoNG. REc. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann).
157. Michigan v. Lucas. 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991). See supra notes 92-99 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Lucas.
158. 124 CONGo REc. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann). See also Lucas,
500 U.S. at 149-50 (rape shield statute is "a valid legislative determination that rape
victims deserve heightened protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary
invasions of privacy").
159. Simmons, supra note 68, at 1604.
160.

[d.

161. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,319 (1974). See also Lucas, 500 U.S. at
149-50.
162. Davis, 415 U.S. at 320.
163. [d.
164. ANN WOLBERT BURGESS & LYNDA LYTLE HOMSTROM, RAPE: VICTIMS OF
CRISIS 197-219 (1974) (describing factors which make trial traumatic for sexual assault
victim); Rene I. Augustine, Marriage: The Safe Haven for Rapists, 29 J. FAM. L. 559, 575
(1991) (noting the traumatic nature of rape trial for women).
165. See Leslie Griffin, The Lawyer's Dirty Hands, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 219,
229 (1995) (noting that the victims are usually on trial in rape cases); Alinor C. Sterling,
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the victim becoming the defendant in the trial.1 66 By protecting the
victim's sexual privacy, the whole process may be less traumatic for
her.167
The privacy interests of rape shield statutes may also be more
important because of the legality of the conduct involved. Juvenile
record protection statutes protect examination of illegal behavior.
Alternatively, rape shield statutes protect behavior that is either not
contrary to the law or not enforced. While committing a crime is
widely recognized as wrong, engaging in sexual conduct is socially
acceptable. Examining a rape victim's sexual history may make her
feel like she has done something wrong by having sex. Since rape
shield statutes prevent the examination of legitimate behavior
which may have the effect of illegitimizing the behavior, rape shield
statutes may encompass a more important privacy right.
In addition, the privacy interests protected by rape shield stat~
utes may be more important because the victim's conduct is gener~
ally not already public knowledge. Although juvenile criminal
proceedings are closed to the public, the juvenile witness's conduct
has been examined by others in some sort of forum.168 Further, the
police must have investigated the juvenile witness's behavior before
he or she could be prosecuted.
Undressing the Victim: The Intersection of Evidentiary and Semiotic Meanings of Wo
men's Clothing in Rape Trials, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 87,123·24 (1995) (discussing
rape law reform and evidence regarding a woman's clothes); Rachel M. Capoccia, Note,
Piercing the Veil of Tears: The Admission of Rape Crisis Counselor Records in Acquain
tance Rape Trials, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1335, 1344 (1995) ("it appeared to most observers
that the rape victim was the one on trial rather than the defendant").
166. Newell H. Blakely, Article IV: Relevancy and Its Limits, 30 Hous. L. REV.
281,478-79 (1993) ("Much of the momentum leading to nearly universal implementa
tion of rape shield laws was the concern that the vast majority of sexual assaults suf
fered by women went unreported partly because of victims' fears that they themselves
would be placed on trial by the defense."); David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Political Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 329 (1995) ("rape shield
laws were intended to end the practice of putting victims on trial").
167. Richard D. Friedman, Evidentiary Rules and Rulings: The Role of Treatises,
25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 885, 885·86 (1992) ("rape shield laws not only keep out evidence
of great potential prejudice and dubious probative value, but also protect the privacy of
complaining witnesses [and] limit the possibility of a renewed trauma") (footnotes
omitted); Lisa M. Dillman, Note, Stephens v. Miller: Restoration of the Rape Defend
ant's Sixth Amendment Rights, 28 IND. L. REV. 97,113 (1994) ("In the quest for a fair
and less traumatic rape trial for victims, the rape shield statute was intended to eradi
cate the traditional misconceptions of rape which held that victims were 'asking for
1't. . . ''')
..

168. Brian R. Suffredini, Note, Juvenile Gunslingers: A Place for Punitive Philoso
phy in Rehabilitative Juvenile Justice, 35 B.C. L. REv. 885,890 (1994) (noting aspects of
juvenile criminal justice system).
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On the other hand, the rape victim was never tried or investi
gated for her prior sexual behavior because it is not a crime or it is
not enforced. Since the victim's sexual history is more private than
the juvenile's criminal behavior, her interest in protecting that
information may be more important. In the foregoing ways, the
privacy interests protected by rape shield statutes may be more im
portant than the privacy interests protected by juvenile-record pro
tection statutes.
However, the privacy interests protected by rape shield stat
utes are more similar than dissimilar to the privacy interests pro
tected by juvenile-record protection statutes. Both statutes exclude
information that the party in question would rather remain un
known. 169 If the information becomes known, the party in question
would be embarrassed and humiliated in front of, at. a minimum, a
courtroom of people po The adjudication of the juvenile's conduct
does not change the fact that he or she does not want that informa
tion to be disseminated.
In addition, just because rape trials are traumatic for rape vic
tims does not make the privacy interests protected by rape shield
statutes more important. The very nature of rape trials makes them
traumatic for the victim.l7l She has to recall all of the intricate de
tails of a devastating event. A rape victim will probably not be sub
stantially less traumatized if the defense is allowed to examine only
her sexual conduct that is relevant to the victim's motive to
fabricate.
Moreover, juvenile record-protection statutes serve privacy in
terests that rape shield statutes do not serve. First, juvenile record
protection statutes ensure that juveniles do not lose job opportuni
ties.172 Exposure of a juvenile's criminal behavior at trial might
lead to discrimination by employers. In addition, exposure of a ju
venile's criminal history may impair his or her rehabilitation
processP3
Further, there may be a greater public stigma attached to being
a criminal than having participated in sexual conduct. Society is
169. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991) (rape shield legislation is
legislative determination that rape victims deserve protection against invasion of pri
vacy); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U,S. 308,320-21 (1974) (noting juvenile interest in protect
ing confidentiality of record).
170. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149-50; Davis, 415 U.S. at 320.
171. See supra note 164.
172. Davis, 415 U.S. at 319-20.
173. Id.
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now more accepting of a woman's sexual conduct outside· of mar
riage. 174 But members of society still do not want a criminal living
next door to themP5
For these reasons, the privacy interests protected by rape
shield statutes and juvenile record-protection statutes are substan
tially similar. The United States Supreme Court held in Davis that
the privacy interests protected by juvenile record protection stat
utes cannot justify restricting a defendant's right to examine a wit
ness's motive to fabricateP6 Therefore, the privacy interests
protected by rape shield statutes also cannot justify restricting the
defendant's right to examine evidence of a victim's sexual history
when it relates to her motive to fabricate.
2. Encouraging Women to Report Crimes Versus the
Defendant's Constitutional Rights
In addition to their goal of protecting privacy interests, legisla
tures enacted rape shield statutes to encourage women to report
sexual assaults. 177 Encouraging sexual assault victims to report
their attackers is critical because of the magnitude of the sexual as
sault problem. Approximately one out of every five adult women
in the United States has been the victim of some form of sexual
assault. 178 Of these sexual assault victims, the FBI estimates that
only ten percent report their attackers to the pOliceP9
Further, recent polls show that a surprisingly high percentage
of college-aged men would rape a woman if they knew that they
would escape prosecution. 180 If women continue to under-report
174. Wayman, supra note 63, at 871-72.
.
175. Cf. Louis P. DiLorenzo & Darren J. Carroll, The Growing Menace: Violence
in the Workplace, 67 N.Y. ST. B.J. 24,26 (1995) (showing prevalence of discrimination
against criminals by noting necessity of law imposing civil liability on employers who
discriminate against criminals).
176. Davis, 415 U.S. at 320.
177. Statement by President Carter on Signing H.R. 4727 into Law, Protection for
the Privacy of Rape Victims, II PUB. PAPERS: Jimmy Carter 1902 (Oct. 30, 1978). See
also Galvin, supra note 6, at 767; Treadwell, supra note 79, at 1297-98.
178. Susan Quinlan, 'One Strike' for Rapists Isn't Nearly Enough, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 1994, at B7.
179. [d.
180. The actual percentage of men who would rape a woman varies upon the
survey. One article includes a survey of 2,000 college men and reveals that 35% of
college men "might rape a woman" if they knew that they would not be caught. Daniel
Goodman, Violence Against Women in Films. N.Y. TIMES. Aug. 28. 1984. at Cl. An
other article reports a survey of college men that revealed that 51 % of men would rape
a woman if they could get away with it. Saying 'No' to Sex Advances Never Means 'Yes'.
BUFFALO NEWS. Apr. 2. 1993. at C2.
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sexual assaults, more men will feel that they can escape the conse
quences of their criminal behavior. 181 As a result, these men will
not be deterred from sexually assaulting women. 182 However, the
Supreme Court's holding in Olden v. Kentucky may possibly pre
vent the "encouraging women to report sexual assaults" rationale
as a justification for restricting the defendant's right to examine a
witness's motive to fabricate.1 83 In Olden, the Supreme Court held
that the speculative benefit of excluding evidence that the white vic
tim was living with a black man could not justify restricting the de
fendant's right to examine a witness's motive to fabricate.1 84 Since
the Supreme Court seemed to emphasize the term "speculative
benefits," it would seem that any interest with a speculative benefit
cannot justify abrogating the defendant's right to examine a wit
ness's motive to fabricate.
There is nothing speculative about the impact that rape shield
statutes have on protecting the victim's privacy rights. l85 However,
the value of rape shield statutes in encouraging women to report
sexual assaults is speculative at best. 186 There is no statistical evi
dence that rape shield statutes have actually been successful in en
couraging women to report sexual assaults.1 87 In fact, there is
181. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 87 (1973) ("If
the command of a legal system were not reinforced with the threat of punishment,
many individuals would see no basis for believing that the legal system really meant
what it said.").
182. Id.
183. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (per curiam).
184. Id. at 231-32.
185. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991). See supra notes 92-99 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Lucas.
186. Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the
Effects of Rape Law Reform: How Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI
NOLOGY 554, 556 & nn.9-10 (1993). The authors of one book conducted an "inter
rupted time-series analysis for data before and after rape law reforms were
implemented in Michigan." Id. at 556 n.9. The study found that the number of re
ported sexual assaults had not risen in Michigan since rape law reforms took effect. Id.
(citing JEANNE C. MARSH, ET AL., RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW REFORM (1982)).
Other studies have been conducted in California, Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia,
Atlanta, Houston, and Washington D.C. Id. at 556 n.lO. Only Detroit and Houston
showed an increase in the number of reported sexual assaults, and Houston's increase
was only slight. Id. (citing Julie Horney & Cassia Spohn, Rape Law Reform and Instru
mental Change in Six Urban Jurisdictions, 25 LAW & SOC'y REV. 117, 119-21 (1991)).
However, this increase may be due to Detroit and Houston enacting comprehensive
and "extremely zealous [rape law] reforms." See id. at 556.
It is important to remember that all of these studies consider the effect of all types
of rape law reform together. Id. at 556 & nn.9-1O. Therefore, rape shield legislation, by
itself, is even less effective in encouraging the reporting of sexual assaults.
187. Id.
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evidence that rape shield statutes have had no effect on encourag
ing women to report sexual assaults. l88 It could be argued that
more time must pass before it can be determined whether rape
shield statutes have encouraged women to report sexual assaults.
However, rape shield statutes have existed for twenty years. 189 If
rape shield statutes have not encouraged women to report their at
tackers in the first twenty years of their existence, then it is reason
able to assume that their impact on reporting sexual assaults will
continue to be negligible in the future.
In addition, allowing a limited exception for sexual history evi
dence that would tend to show the victim's motive to fabricate will
probably not affect any woman who would be encouraged by a rape
shield statute to report a sexual assault. It is unlikely that many
members of the public would even realize that a motive to fabricate
exception to rape shield statutes exists. 190 If victims do not know
that a motive to fabricate exception exists, its existence can have no
effect on the victim's decision of whether to report a sexual assault.
Further, under Olden, the very fact that this issue is arguable
means that Olden controls. 191 Olden does not require courts to
favor the defendant's right to examine a witness's motive to fabri
cate only if the other legitimate interest serves no benefit.1 92 In
stead, Olden allows a defendant to examine a witness's motive to
fabricate if the conflicting interest has speculative benefits .193 For
these reasons, the fact that legislatures enacted rape shield statutes
to encourage women to report sexual assaults cannot justify re
stricting the defendant's right to examine a witness's motive to
fabricate.
188. Id.
189. Galvin, supra note 6, at 765 n.3.
190. Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Targeted, Direct-Mail Solicitation: Shapero v. Kentucky
Bar Association Under Attack, 25 Loy. U. Qu. L.J. 1 (1993) ("The vast majority of the
public exhibits an alarming ignorance about the law and its impact on their lives.");
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Essay, People's Court, 44 VAND. L. REv. 847,860 (1991) (noting
the public's general ignorance about the law).
191. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988) (per curiam). The Supreme
Court stated that interests with speculative benefits cannot justify restricting the defend
ant's right to examine a witness's motive to fabricate. The word "speculative" means
"not established by demonstration." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC
TIONARY 2189 (3d ed. 1976). Therefore, if something is arguable, it cannot be estab
lished by demonstration. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Olden.
192. Olden,488 U.S. at 231.
193. Id.
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3. Helping to Eliminate Gender Bias Versus Defendant's
Constitutional Rights
Legislatures also enacted rape shield statutes hoping that they
would help eliminate gender bias in the determination of whether a
sexual assault occurred. 194 Gender bias results from the fact that
men have different "perceptions of the quality and nature of con
sent" to sexual intercourse,195 This is especially true given the fact
that women are socialized "to react passively to male sexual
aggression. "196
The precedential value of Olden in dismissing gender bias as a
justification for restricting the defendant's right to examine a wit
ness's motive to fabricate is particularly strong. 197 In Olden, the
United States Supreme Court held that "speculation as to the effect
of jurors' racial biases cannot justify exclusion of cross-examina
tion" of the witness's motive to fabricate,198 Here, we are con
cerned with the speculative nature of the juror's gender biases. 199 If
gender bias is substantially similar to the type of racial bias that the
Court considered in Olden, then gender bias cannot be a justifica
tion for restricting the defendant's right to examine the victim's mo
tive to fabricate.
Gender and racial biases 'are nearly identical for purposes of
the Olden analysis. First, both gender and racial bias have been
prevalent for centuries. 20o In addition, there is no way of knowing
for sure whether jurors have either a gender or racial bias or what
effect that bias will have on their decisions. Further, prosecutors
194, Simmons, supra note 68, at 1604-05, For a general discussion of gender bias
in courts, see Hon, Dorothy W, Nelson, Introduction to the Effects of Gender in the
Federal Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S.
CAL, L. REv. 731 (1994); Kittie D. Warshawsky, The Judicial Canons: A First Seep in
Addressing Gender Bias in the Courtroom, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1047 (1994).
195. Simmons, supra note 68, at 1604.
196. [d.
197. Olden, 488 U.S. at 231 (holding speculation as to the effect racially-related
evidence had on juror's racial bias could not justify restricting the defendant's right to
examine a witness's motive to fabricate).
198. Id. at 232.
.
199. A bias is a "prepossession with some Object or point of view [such] that the
mind does not respond impartially to anything related to this object or point of view."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 211 (3d ed. 1976).
200. See Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges After
Batson v, KentUCky and J.E.B. v. Alabama: An Equal Protection and First Amendment
Analysis, 94 MICH. L. REv. 191,205-07 (1995) (discussing discrimination against minori
ties and women in jury selection); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Appendix: Some Notes on
State Affirmative Action in Employment, 26 PAC. L.J. 812, 812-13 (1995) (noting history
of discrimination in employment against minorities and women).

570

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:541

have both the opportunity and motive to exclude people who have
either gender or racial biases if such a bias will have an effect on a
juror's decision. Thus, there are other protections against such bias,
but bias of some sort is basically unpreventable.
These material similarities between gender and racial biases
show that Olden must apply equally to claims of possible racial and
gender bias. The Olden Court recognized that the speculative ben
efit of excluding evidence that may create a possible jury bias could
not justify restricting the defendant's strong interest in examining a
witness's motive to fabricate. 201 Therefore, the rape shield statute's
interest in helping to eliminate gender bias in the courtroom cannot
justify restricting the defendant's right to examine the victim's mo
tive to fabricate.
4.

Weighing All of the Interests

Courts should not interpret rape shield statutes to exclude sex
ual history evidence relevant to the victim's motive to fabricate.
The Supreme Court held in Rock v. Arkansas that courts may not
abridge the accused's constitutionally protected right to present evi
dence in his or her own behalf if such a restriction would be arbi
trary or disproportionate to the purposes it was designed to
serve.202 The purpose of rape shield statutes is to protect the pri
vacy rights of sexual assault victims,203 to encourage sexual assault
victims to report their attackers,204 and to eliminate gender bias in
the court room.205 Davis v. Alaska and Olden v. Kentucky exem
plify that restricting a defendant's right to examine a witness's mo
tive to fabricate to advance the interests protected by rape shield
statutes would be arbitrary and disproportionate to the purposes
they are designed to serve.206
The privacy interests protected by rape shield statutes are sub
stantially similar to the privacy interests protected by juvenile rec
ord-protection statutes that the Supreme Court considered in Davis
Olden, 488 U.S. at 231-32.
202. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1987). See supra notes 31-36 and
accompanying text fora discussion of Rock.
203. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991). See supra notes 92-99 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Lucas.
204. Statement by President Carter on Signing H.R. 4727 into Law, Protection for
the Privacy of Rape Victims, II PuB. PAPERS: Jimmy Carter 1902 (Oct. 30, 1978).
205. Simmons, supra note 68, at 1604-05.
206. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988) (per curiam); Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320-21 (1974).
201.
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v. Alaska.207 . In Davis, the Supreme Court held that the policy in
terests protected by juvenile-record protection statutes must give
way to the defendant's right to examine a witness's motive to fabri
cate.20S Both juvenile record-protection statutes and rape shield
statutes prevent the examination of information that the party in
question would prefer to remain unknown. 209 In addition, both the
juvenile witness and the rape victim will be humiliated and embar
rassed if this information is made public. 210 Despite any nominal
differences between rape shield statutes and juvenile record protec
tion statutes, the privacy interests protected by both statutes are
essentially the same. 211 Therefore, Davis rejects the rape shield
law's privacy interest rationale as a grounds for restricting the de
fendant's right to examine the victim's motive to fabricate.
In addition, the fact that legislatures enacted rape shield stat
utes to encourage women to report sexual assaults is similar to the
interest considered by the Supreme Court in Olden v. Kentucky.212
In Olden, the Supreme Court held that the speculative benefit of
excluding evidence that the white victim was living with a black
man could not justify restricting the defendant's constitutionally
protected right to examine a witness's motive to fabricate. 213 Like
wise, the benefit of rape shield statutes in encouraging women to
report sexual assaults is speculative at best.214 Studies reveal that
there has not been an increase in the number of reported sexual
assaults since rape shield statutes took effect. 2Is The United States
Supreme Court has already held in Olden that interests with specu
lative benefits cannot be used to restrict the defendant's right to
examine a witness's motive to fabricate. 216 Therefore, the fact that
legislatures adopted rape shield statutes to encourage women to re
2ff7. Davis, 415 U.S. 308. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Davis.
208. Davis, 415 U.S. at 320.
209. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991); Davis, 415 U.S. at 320
21.
210. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149-50; Davis, 415 U.S. at 320-21.
211. See supra part II.A.l for a comparison of the privacy interests protected by
rape shield statutes and juvenile record-protection statutes.
212. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227,232 (1988) (per curiam). See supra
notes 50-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Olden.
213. Olden, 488 U.S. at 231-33.
214. Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 186, at 556.
215. Id.
216. Olden, 488 U.S. at 232. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Olden.
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port sexual assaults cannot justify preventing the defendant from
examining a sexual assault victim's motive to fabricate.
Finally, rape shield statutes' interest in eliminating gender bias
in the courtroom does not justify restricting the criminal defend~
ant's right to examine a witness's motive to fabricate. The Olden
Court held that "speculation as to the effect of jurors' racial biases
cannot justify" excluding evidence relating to the witness's motive
to fabricate. 217 The reasoning of Olden applies equally to gender
bias. It is impossible to know exactly how evidence of a victim's
sexual history-which is limited to that which is relevant and proba
tive on the issue of the victim's motive to fabricate-will effect the
jurors' gender biases. Therefore, the fact that legislatures enacted
rape shield statutes to help eliminate gender bias cannot justify re
stricting the defendant's right to examine a witness's motive to
fabricate.
Although neither Davis nor Olden specifically involved rape
shield statutes, other cases such as United States v. Williams ,218
Commonwealth v. Joyce,219 and Lewis v. State 220 have recognized
the holdings in Davis and Olden as encompassing the policy consid
erations protected by rape shield statutes. 221 Davis and Olden re
ject all three types of interests protected by rape shield statutes as
justifications for abrogating the defendant's right to examine a wit
ness's motive to fabricate. 222 Therefore, courts should not interpret
rape shield statutes to automatically exclude sexual history evi
dence relative to the victim's motive to fabricate.
B.

Finding a Middle Ground
It may appear that recognizing a motive to fabricate exception

to rape shield statutes would allow every criminal defendant to in
troduce potentially damaging sexual history evidence about the vic
217. Olden, 488 U.S. at 232.
218. 37 M.J. 352 (C.M.A. 1993). See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Williams.
219. 415 N.E.2d 181 (Mass. 1981). See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Joyce.
220. 591 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1991). See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Lewis.
221. See, e.g., United States v. Nez, 661 F.2d 1203, 1206 (10th Cir. 1981); Williams,
37 M.J. at 360; Lewis, 591 So. 2d at 925; State v. Parker, 730 P.2d 921, 925 (Idaho 1986);
Joyce, 415 N.E.2d at 186; Winfield v. Commonwealth, 301 S.E.2d 15,21 (Va. 1983).
222. See supra part II.A.l-II.A.3 for a discussion of how Davis and Olden reject
the interests protected by rape shield laws as justifications for restricting the defend
ant's right to examine a witness's motive to fabricate.
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tim by stating that the witness had a motive to fabricate. However,
this should not be the result because courts have tools for preclud
ing evidence that is of little or no probative value and that presents
a serious risk of misuse.
First, courts can exclude evidence on relevancy grounds. For
example, Federal Rule of Evidence 402 declares that irrelevant evi
dence is inadmissible. 223 Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines rele
vant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence ... more probable or
less probable than ... without the evidence."224 Therefore, courts
always have the option of excluding sexual history evidence that
does not actually bear on an issue of consequence to the case. 225
Admittedly, relevance is a fairly easy standard to meet. 226
However, courts can also exclude sexual history evidence under
probative value-prejudicial impact balancing tests (probative value
weighing tests).227 For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 al
lows courts to exclude relevant evidence if the probative value of
the evidence "is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by con
siderations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence."228 Therefore, when the sexual history evi
dence does not have a strong tendency to show that the victim may
have lied, courts may be able to properly exclude the sexual history
evidence under probative value weighing tests.
There are a number of circumstances in which courts may be
able to properly exclude sexual history evidence under a probative
value weighing test. For example, a court probably could exclude
sexual history evidence if it has a low probative value and there is a
danger that the evidence will establish that the victim is promiscu
223. FED. R. EVID. 402.
224. FED. R. EVID. 401.
225. E.g., United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1468-69 (9th Cir. 1991); White v.
State, 598 A.2d 187, 193-94 (Md. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 975 (1992).
226. Joan L. Larsen, Of Propensity, Prejudice, and Plain Meaning: The Accused's
Use of Exculpatory Specific Acts Evidence and the Need to Amend Rule 404(b), 87 Nw.
U. L. REv. 651,654 ("relevance ... is relatively easy to clear given the liberal standards
established ..."); Elaine A. Imbriani, Casenote, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 259, 287
(1993) (quoting Dawson V. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 174 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting),
for the proposition that relevance is an easy standard for defendants to satisfy).
227. FED. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 provides that "relevant[ ] evidence may be ex
cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
228. Id.
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ous. Although, society has generally accepted that women have sex
outside of marriage,229 if a woman has had sex with several men,
some fact~finders may believe that she is promiscuous. Many peo
ple think that promiscuous women are unlikely to refuse a male's
advances. Therefore, a strong danger arises that juries will be im
properly influenced by motive to fabricate evidence which shows
that the woman is promiscuous.
In addition, courts may be able to exclude sexual history evi
dence if it has a low probative value and the evidence adds nothing
new to the issue in light of non-sexual evidence. One of the
grounds under which courts can exclude relevant evidence is need
less presentation of cumulative evldence.23o If the sexual history
evidence adds absolutely nothing new to the issue in light of non~
sexual history evidence, then allowing the sexual history evidence is
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. There may be other
situations in which the judge can use a probative value weighing
test to exclude sexual history evidence. However, the issue is less
clear when the evidence becomes more probative, less dangerous,
and fewer alternative pieces of evidence that show the victim's mo
tive to lie exist.
United States v. Payne 231 exemplifies how courts can employ a
combined relevance and probative value weighing test to exclude
sexual history evidence. In Payne, the defendant, who was the vic
tim's step-father, claimed that the trial court erred in failing to ad
mit evidence that he found the victim "in a state of partial undress
engaged in heavy petting with a boy."232 The defendant claimed
the evidence established a motive to fabricate because the victim
wanted to retaliate for being punished.233
In Payne, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit used a combined relevance and probative value weighing
test to exclude sexual history evidence relating to the victim's mo
tive to fabricate. 234 The court reasoned that the evidence was "min
imally (if at aU) probative" because the victim's first claim of
molestation occurred more than seven months after the defendant
disciplined her for the episode of heavy petting.235 In addition, the
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Wayman, supra note 63, at 871-72.
See FED. R. EVID. 403.
944 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 975 (1992).
[d. at 1468.
Id. at 1468-69.
[d. at 1468-70.
[d. at 1469.
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court reasoned that since the trial court allowed the defendant to
testify that he punished the victim for an incident, describing the
sexual nature of the incident added nothing new to the victim's mo
tive to lie.236 Given these findings, the court held that the trial
court properly excluded the sexual conduct evidence. If courts em
ploy this type of relevance and probative value weighing analysis,
they can eliminate most of the fraudulent claims made under the
motive to fabricate exception.
Even with these built-in safeguards, some sexual assault de
fendants will be able to satisfy the relevancy and probative value
weighing tests and improperly introduce sexual history evidence by
saying that it is related to the victim's motive to fabricate. This is
unfortunate. However, Davis v. Alaska and Olden v. Kentucky
show that the defendant's constitutional right to examine a wit
ness's motive to fabricate cannot be restricted by the privacy inter
ests237 and the interests of speculative value238 that rape shield
statutes protect.
CONCLUSION

The defendant has the right to present relevant testimony in
his own behalf. This includes the right to examine the alleged vic
tim for bias and a possible motive to fabricate. This right is cer
tainly not unyielding and may be abridged by other legitimate
interests. However, restricting the defendant's right to present rele
vant testimony about the victim's motive to fabricate cannot be
arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes the restriction is
designed to serve.
Rape shield statutes serve the legitimate interest of protecting
sexual assault victims from such things as public humiliation and
unfair invasions of privacy. By protecting the privacy interests of
the victim, the proponents of rape shield statut..!s also hoped to en
courage sexual assault victims to report sexual assaults to the po
lice. In addition, rape shield statutes are also designed to eliminate
or reduce gender bias in the court room. By serving such legitimate
interests, courts may interpret rape shield statutes to exclude evi
dence of a victim's motive to fabricate if such an exclusion is neither
236. Id.
237. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974). See supra notes 39-49 and accom
panying text for a discussion of Davis.
238. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232 (1988) (per curiam). See supra notes
50-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Olden.
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arbitrary nor disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to
serve.
However, the United States Supreme Court's rulings in Davis
v. Alaska and Olden v. Kentucky hold that the interests protected
by rape shield statutes cannot justify restricting the defendant's
right to examine a witness's motive to fabricate. Therefore, courts
must admit the sexual history evidence relating to the victim's mo
tive to fabricate. Sexual history evidence must, however, first pass
the relevancy and probative value balancing tests before courts
must admit such evidence. In some cases, a defendant may in bad
faith introduce sexual history evidence notwithstanding relevancy
and probative value-prejudicial impact tests. Although permitting
some defendants to make bad faith allegations undermines the ef
fectiveness of rape shield statutes, this result is required by the
Supreme Court's holdings in Davis v. Alaska and Olden v.
Kentucky.
Jason M. Price

